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1 Faculty of Kinesiology and Physical Education, University of Toronto, Toronto, ON, Canada, 2 Department of Psychology,
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Typically, when two individuals perform a task together, each partner monitors the other
partners’ responses and goals to ensure that the task is completed efficiently. This
monitoring is thought to involve a co-representation of the joint goals and task, as well
as a simulation of the partners’ performance. Evidence for such “co-representation” of
goals and task, and “simulation” of responses has come from numerous visual attention
studies in which two participants complete different components of the same task. In
the present research, an adaptation of the attentional blink task was used to determine if
co-representation could exert an influence over the associated attentional mechanisms.
Participants completed a rapid serial visual presentation task in which they first identified
a target letter (T1) and then detected the presence of the letter X (T2) presented one to
seven letters after T1. In the individual condition, the participant identified T1 and then
detected T2. In the joint condition, one participant identified T1 and the other participant
detected T2. Across two experiments, an attentional blink (decreased accuracy in
detecting T2 when presented three letters after T1) was observed in the individual
condition, but not in joint conditions. A joint attentional blink may not emerge because
the co-representation mechanisms that enable joint action exert a stronger influence at
information processing stages that do not overlap with those that lead to the attentional
blink.
Keywords: attentional blink, joint action, co-representation, joint information processing, cognition, attention
INTRODUCTION
In many daily tasks, such as cooking in a kitchen or searching for several items in a room, an
individual will recruit the help of other people to complete the task more efficiently than if that
individual performed the task alone. For this efficiency to occur, each individual in the group
should know the overall goal of the task and the smaller sub-goals of their co-actors. Further, each
individual should monitor their co-actors’ actions so that they can coordinate efforts and decrease
redundant performance. Consider, for example, a situation in which Bob and Doug are searching
for the items they need to go out and buy coffee and jelly doughnuts from the local coffee shop.
Both Bob and Doug understand the super-ordinate goal of leaving the house efficiently and that, to
achieve that goal, each person might be responsible for finding different items: Bob may be tasked
with retrieving the wallet and the keys to the van while Doug must find the hats and mittens.
To ensure the overall job is completed efficiently, Bob and Doug will likely maintain the goals of
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the other person in mind and monitor the performance of each
other to know when the jobs are done. In this scenario, holding
the co-actors’ task in mind will not only help to determine when
the whole task is done, but it may also help to complete the overall
task more efficiently because each individual would not ignore a
target of their partner if they happen to come across it first: that is,
Doug should not ignore and leave behind the keys if he finds them
before Bob. Stopping their own search to identify and obtain
the target of the partner might slow down their own sub-tasks,
but may increase the efficiency of the overall search task. Thus,
maintaining (co-representing) a partner’s goals in addition to
one’s own goals may make the overall task more efficient despite
a small and temporary cost of the individual’s own performance.
To gain an understanding of the processes enabling the
completion of joint action and search tasks, researchers have
typically adapted paradigms that have been developed to
understand how people perform tasks individually to the joint
action context for use with dyads (e.g., Sebanz et al., 2003;
Welsh et al., 2005; Atmaca et al., 2008; Constable et al., 2015).
The key feature of these studies is that the task is divided
among two individuals such that each individual performs a sub-
task that is essentially independent of their co-actor, but that
collectively the pair of individuals are performing the full task
in a social environment. The logic behind this approach is the
following: If individuals working independently in this social
environment do not co-represent or code for the actions and
goals of the partner, then the behavioral effect that emerges when
an individual completes the whole task while acting alone should
not emerge in the performance of the co-actors. However, if
individuals working independently in this social environment
co-represent the actions and goals of the co-actor, then the
behavioral effect that emerges when an individual completes the
whole task while acting alone should emerge in the performance
of the co-actors. The results of these joint action studies have been
largely consistent with the latter hypothesis because behavioral
effects that emerge when individuals complete a whole task
alone also emerge in the behavior of individuals completing sub-
components of the whole task. Thus, even though each individual
has a distinct and independent task to complete, the data from
joint action and search studies suggest that individuals know and
code for the goals and tasks of their partner simultaneously to
their own goals and responses.
An example of such a joint action and social search task
that has been used to generate an understanding of the co-
representation process is one in which two participants sit across
from each other at a table and execute a series of movements
from separate starting positions to a pair of target locations (e.g.,
Welsh et al., 2005, 2007, 2009; Hayes et al., 2010; Skarratt et al.,
2010; Cole et al., 2012, 2018; Doneva and Cole, 2014; Janczyk
et al., 2016; see also Ondobaka et al., 2012). In the studies by
Welsh and colleagues, the targets appear randomly at one of two
locations such that the location of the target on trial “n” does not
predict the location of the target on trial “n+1.” Participants take
turns responding to the targets in a paired-alternating manner
such that the actor (Bob) would make two responses and then
the partner (Doug) would execute two responses and so on (i.e.,
BBDDBBDD, etc.). With this method, the researchers were able
to examine reaction times (RTs) on trials on which the target was
in the same or a different location as the previous trial. When
individuals perform such a sequence of responses, there are a
multitude of studies that show RTs on trials in which the target
is at the same location as the previous trial are longer than if
the target is at a different location. These longer RTs for trials
with repeated relative to different target locations are thought to
emerge because shifting attention to and executing a response at
one location eventually leads to the activation of an inhibitory
code at that location. This inhibitory code hinders the return of
attention and/or the reactivation of the response to that location –
an inhibition of return (IOR) effect [e.g., Posner and Cohen,
1984; Maylor and Hockey, 1985; Welsh and Pratt, 2006; see Klein
(2000) for review].
The key findings of the Welsh et al., (2005, 2007, 2009);
studies [see also Cole et al. (2012, 2018)] was that an IOR effect
emerged both when the participants acted two times in a row
(an individual IOR effect on BB and DD trials) and when the
participants acted after observing the response of their partner
(a social IOR effect on BD and DB trials). Thus, IOR emerged
when the individual executed their own response or observed
the response of the partner. It is important to reemphasize
here that, although both individuals executed movements to
the same set of targets, their responses were independent from
each other and were incidental to each partner’s task. In other
words, the partner’s previous response did not predict nor was
coordinated with the subsequent response of the actor, yet IOR
emerged. Although some researchers have suggested that the
social IOR effect emerges solely due to attentional mechanisms
(see Atkinson et al., 2014; Doneva and Cole, 2014), the most
common account is that the social IOR effect is generated because
the knowledge and observation of the partners’ action lead to
a co-representation and simulation of the partner’s response,
subsequently activating the same mechanisms that generate
the IOR effect when the person acts alone. In support of the
hypothesis that the same mechanisms are activated following the
execution and observation of the response, Welsh et al. (2009)
found that the magnitude of the social IOR effects (RTs on same
target trials minus RTs on different target trials) was significantly
correlated with the magnitude of the IOR effect on individual
trials. Overall, the data from the studies of the social IOR effect
indicate that, even though two individuals complete independent
tasks in succession in a common environment, the tasks, goals,
and actions of the independent partners are co-represented and
affect each other’s performance.
Similar co-representation and simulation accounts have been
extended to account for other joint action and social search tasks
such as the joint negative priming effect (Frischen et al., 2009;
Welsh and McDougall, 2012). In these studies, participants are
presented with a pair of displays (first a prime and then a probe
display). Each display has a target and a distractor stimulus,
and the task is to respond to the location of the target and
ignore the location of the distractor. The location of the target
and distractor varies from trial-to-trial and from prime to probe
display. The two key trial types in the negative priming task
are: (1) the baseline control trials – the target and distractor
on the probe display appear at different locations from the
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target and distractor on the prime display and (2) the ignored
repetition trials – the target on the probe display appears at
the same location as the distractor on the prime display. It
has repeatedly been demonstrated that RTs for probe targets
on ignored repetition trials are longer than on baseline control
trials. One of the predominant explanations of the longer RTs
for probe targets of ignored repetition trials than on baseline
trials is the selection inhibition account [Tipper, 1985; see Tipper
(2001) for a review]. According to this account, selection of the
target from the distractor on the prime display involves both the
activation of the target information and the active inhibition of
the distractor information. The inhibitory mechanism activated
for the distractor on the prime display persists for some time. If
the probe target is subsequently presented at the location of the
prime distractor, the residual inhibition at that location hinders
processing of the probe target at that location, increasing RTs.
On baseline trials, the probe target is presented at a previously
unoccupied location and thus processing of that probe target is
unaffected by the selection process on the prime display and is
relatively more efficient than the processing of the probe target
on ignored repetition trials. Thus, this negative priming effect for
probe targets occurs because of the successful target/distractor
selection on the prime display.
In the individual version of the task used in studies of the
joint negative priming effect (Frischen et al., 2009; Welsh and
McDougall, 2012), a single participant completed the selection on
both prime and probe displays. In the joint version, participants
completed the task in pairs – one participant (Bob) completed
the selection on the prime display and only responded to target
1, and the second participant (Doug) completed the selection
on the probe display and only responded to target 2 (Frischen
et al., 2009; Welsh and McDougall, 2012). These studies have
revealed that, even though each individual is responsible for only
responding to their own stimuli on separate displays (and could
effectively ignore the stimuli in their partner’s display), a negative
priming effect still emerges on joint trials – Doug’s RTs to target 2
on the probe trials are longer when target 2 in the probe display is
presented at the same location as distractor 1 on the prime display
than when target 2 is presented at a different location. This joint
negative priming effect was suggested to emerge because, even
though Bob’s (the first person) task precedes and is irrelevant to
Doug (the second person) and Doug could have simply ignored
the prime display, Doug will spontaneously co-represent the
goals and actions of Bob and simulate Bob’s performance (i.e.,
simulate the target selection and response execution as well as the
subsequent inhibition of the distractor). This co-representation
and subsequent simulation of task performance activates the
same mechanisms that would be activated if Doug worked alone
and performed the entire task. This simulation leads to the
same interference effects that emerge as though the individual
performed the task on their own [see also Welsh et al. (2005)
for a similar account of the social IOR effect]. In support of the
hypothesis that the same mechanisms are activated on individual
and joint trials, Welsh and McDougall (2012) reported that the
magnitude of the negative priming effect on individual and joint
trials was significantly correlated (see also Welsh et al., 2009).
Overall, the results of the joint negative priming and social IOR
studies provide evidence in favor of the hypothesis that co-
actors maintain a representation of their partner’s task and may
engage in a simulation of their partner’s performance when they
observe that selection, even when it is temporally distinct and
independent from their own task.
It is important to recognize that although the work reviewed
here has shed some important new light on the processes of joint
action and social searches, the tasks used in this work largely
engage spatial and response selection processes (e.g., Sebanz et al.,
2003; Welsh et al., 2005; Frischen et al., 2009; see also Ray and
Welsh, 2011). That is, even though the social IOR and negative
priming tasks have a temporal component in that participants
consistently alternate their task performance, the main features
that define these tasks are that participants must determine target
from non-target locations and rapidly execute spatially defined
responses to the selected target. How and if co-representation
affects processes involving temporal selection and identification
is largely unknown.
The primary goal of the present studies was to address this
gap regarding temporal selection and identification by adapting
a task that is better suited to investigating those processes in
a joint action context: the attentional blink task. Importantly,
the attentional blink is thought to result from the activation
of mechanisms that are distinct from those that generate IOR
and negative priming effects. In other words, the attentional
blink task allows us to explore the co-representation of targets
and temporal selection in joint action tasks in that participants
alternate identifying targets in a task that does not involve spatial
and response selection and execution as in previous joint tasks
(i.e., we were not just measuring the IOR and NP processes in a
different way).
In the typical (single participant) attentional blink task, an
individual participant watches a series of stimuli (often letters)
presented in rapid succession. The task of the participant is
to watch the string of stimuli and determine if two targets
are presented in the series of stimuli (e.g., Raymond et al.,
1992, 1994). The key to the design of these tasks is that the
two targets are embedded in the series of stimuli at different
intervals apart from each other – the second stimulus could be
presented immediately after the first target (Lag 1) or anywhere
from 2 or more stimuli after the first target (Lag 2, Lag 3,
etc.). The key finding from this work is that the detection of
the second target (T2) is impaired by detection of the first
target (T1), with the greatest impairment in the performance
occurring when the T2 is presented two to three stimuli (Lag 2–3
or approximately 180 ms) after T1. Performance at identifying
the T2 typically increases and returns to baseline levels when
T2 is four or more stimuli after T1 (Lag 4+). This short-
term decrement in performance for identifying the T2 at Lag
2–3 is known as the attentional blink [Raymond et al., 1992;
see Dux and Marois (2009) for a review]. Although there is
no single account of attentional blink effect that can explain
all the findings, most accounts are based on the notion that
the effect occurs because of early attentional mechanisms or
limited loading or processing resources in working memory,
not response selection and production processing (see Dux and
Marois, 2009; cf. Jolicoeur, 1998).
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Participants in the present studies completed a series of
attentional blink tasks. Each task consisted of a series of rapidly
presented letters and participants were required to determine if
two targets appeared in the string of letters. The three conditions
were: (1) an individual condition in which one participant
responded to both targets, (2) a joint condition in which one
person (Bob) identified the first target (T1) and the partner
(Doug) identified the second target (T2), and (3) a second joint
condition in which the roles were reversed – the partner (Doug)
responded to T1 and the other person (Bob) responded to T2.
The tasks were completed such that one joint task was always
completed first with Bob responding to T1 and Doug responding
to T2. After the first joint task, the participants completed
their individual task conditions. For the final block, participants
completed the joint task again but with the roles switched –
Doug responded to T1 and Bob responded to T2. The rationale
for choosing this specific order will be discussed in subsequent
paragraphs.
The most theoretically relevant conditions for the present
study were the joint conditions in which one of the participants
responded to T2 only. The performance of participants on
identifying T2 when their partner identified T1 (joint condition)
provided an index of the joint attentional blink. If knowledge and
co-representation of a co-actor’s task influences the mechanisms
associated with the joint attentional blink, then a joint attentional
blink will emerge. Such a finding would be consistent with
the studies suggesting that knowledge and co-representation
may lead to other social attention effects such as social IOR
(Welsh et al., 2005) and negative priming (Welsh and McDougall,
2012). A joint attentional blink effect should emerge if the
partner responding to T2 co-represents and simulates the
performance of their partner who identifies T1. If knowledge and
co-representation of the other persons’ task does not occur or
if co-representation does not influence the processing of target
information at these stages, then a joint attentional blink should
not emerge.
Although the two joint conditions were the most critical,
the individual condition served two important purposes. First,
it served as a measure of internal validity to ensure that
the stimulus conditions employed in the present study could
evoke the attentional blink. Second, because each participant
completed the individual task in between the two joint tasks,
the individual task provided one-half of the participants with
task experience prior to the critical joint task in which they
identified T2 after their partner identified T1. Research has
revealed that recent task experience can modulate the perception
and imagination of action (e.g., Chandrasekharan et al., 2012;
Wong et al., 2013) – two processes thought to involve action
simulation. It is likely that task performance enhances these
processes because experience strengthens the representations
of the action and perceptual codes associated with the task,
and leads to increased knowledge of the task and response
conditions. Thus, providing one-half of the participants with
task experience prior to responding to T2 allowed us to
investigate whether or not experience with the task potentiates
the co-representation and the subsequent joint attentional
blink.
EXPERIMENT 1
We adapted a conventional attentional blink task such that pairs
of participants could complete both an individual attentional
blink task and a joint attentional blink task. In the individual task,
the participant identified both T1 and T2. In the joint task, one
participant identified T1 and the other participant identified T2.
Materials and Methods
Participants
Twenty-six undergraduate students from the University of
Toronto participated in the experiment for course credit.
Participants were aged 17–28 years (M = 19.88, SD = 2.78) and
19 were female. All participants had normal or corrected-to-
normal vision. All participants provided informed consent prior
to completing the tasks. The methods employed were approved
by the Office of Research Ethics at the University of Toronto.
Apparatus
Stimuli were presented on a 1024× 768 CRT monitor with a
refresh rate of 85 Hz. Presentation of the stimuli was controlled by
Python using Psychopy (Peirce, 2007). All responses were entered
on a standard QWERTY keyboard. The computer screen and
keyboard were positioned on a table in front of the participants.
During the individual block, participants sat directly in front
of a computer screen (a distance of approximately 57 cm
away). During the joint blocks, the participants sat side-by-side
approximately 57 cm from the computer screen. The computer
used in the joint tasks was different from that used in the
individual tasks. The three computers were separated by an office
partition. The position of the participants in the room and the
task order they performed was randomized.
Design and Procedure
In each testing session, there was a total of four blocks of 240
trials. Each participant, however, only participated in three of
the four blocks. The first block was always a joint condition,
the second and third blocks were individual conditions that
participants completed separately and simultaneously, and the
last block was a joint condition. Specifically, the first block
was a joint task in which Participant A responded to T1 and
Participant B responded to T2. The second/third blocks consisted
of individual task trials in which both participants completed the
task individually by responding to both T1 and T2. The individual
tasks were completed at the same time on separate computers.
The final block of trials was a joint task trials in which Participant
B responded toT1 and Participant A responded to T2.
The experimental program, and hence the trial sequence, was
the same for each condition. A trial began with a black central
fixation cross that was presented on a gray background for 16
frames (187.2 ms). This cross was followed by a stream of 19 black
letters and 1 white letter (1 VA). Each letter was presented for two
frames (23.4 ms) with an inter-stimulus interval of seven frames
(81.9 ms). Each non-target letter was selected from a pool of
letters without replacement. T1 was selected from a pool of eight
target letters, was colored white, and could appear at position
4, 5, 6, or 7 in the letter stream. A T1 was presented on every
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 4 September 2018 | Volume 9 | Article 1714
fpsyg-09-01714 September 10, 2018 Time: 17:34 # 5
Constable et al. Two Minds Don’t Blink Alike
trial. T2 was always a black X and could appear 1, 3, 5, or 7 letter
positions after T1. T2 was presented on 50% of trials. Participants
were instructed to remember T1 and T2 to respond to two probe
questions following the stream of letters (Figure 1) using the
keyboard. For T1, participants pressed the key that corresponded
to the identity of the letter. For T2, participants pressed “Y” or
“N” to indicate if they detected the presence of the back “X’ or
not, respectively. The response for T1 was always inputted prior
to the response for T2.
Trials in the different task conditions were always the
same. For the individual condition, participants identified and
responded to both T1 and T2. Participants shared the task in the
joint blocks – one participant would respond to T1 and the other
responded to T2. For a given block of trials in the joint conditions,
the role of the participants remained the same such that one
participant (Bob) responded to T1 and the other participant
(Doug) responded to T2 in the first joint task, and then changed
roles in the second joint task block so that Doug responded to T1
and Bob responded to T2 in the last block of trials. Although each
participant was present for the instructions and knew the task of
their partner, they were not specifically instructed to attend to or
monitor their partner’s task. In between the two joint tasks, each
participant completed an individual block in which one person
responded to both T1 and T2.
Results and Discussion
Accuracy rates for T2 at each lag were calculated. For individual
blocks, responses at T2 were only analyzed if the response at T1
was accurate. For the joint blocks, responses at T2 were analyzed
regardless of accuracy at T1 because responses were made by two
separate individuals (cognitive systems) and participants were
not given any specific instructions to monitor the performance
of their partner on T1. T1 was identified accurately on an average
of 95.61% trials (SD = 4.70%) on the joint task and an average
of 90.46% trials (SD = 7.49%) in the individual task. Data sets
characterized by exceptionally low (below 50%) T2 accuracy at
Lag 7 (at a time point in which identification should be at
baseline levels; i.e., high) were removed prior to the analysis. This
performance criterion accounted for the removal of two paired
data sets in the joint condition and six individual data sets. To
determine if an attentional blink was present in each condition,
the analysis focused on the difference between the accuracy of
detecting T2 at Lag 3 and Lag 5 (MacLean and Arnell, 2012).
FIGURE 1 | Time-course of a trial. This trial depicts a trial with a three stimulus lag between T1 and T2.
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FIGURE 2 | Detection rates of T2 (% of correctly identified as a function of the
targets presented) for Experiment 1. Error bars represent standard error of the
mean. ∗Denotes significance at p < 0.05.
Separate paired samples t-tests were conducted on the individual
and joint conditions (Figure 2).
An attentional blink was detected in the individual condition
with T2 detection rates at Lag 3 being lower than at Lag 5,
t(19) = −7.14, p < 0.001, 95% CI of Lag 3/Lag 5 difference
[−30.84, −16.86]. Conversely, no joint attentional blink was
observed, t(21) = 0.552, p = 0.587, 95% CI of Lag 3/Lag 5
difference [−3.36, 5.79]. To further determine if participants
demonstrated an attentional blink in the joint task with a
magnitude that is consistent with the attentional blink in the
individual task, the difference between the detection rates at Lag
3 and Lag 5 in the joint task was calculated for each participant
and compared to the 95% confidence intervals for the attentional
blink in the individual task (−30.84 to −16.86). Only 1 of the 22
participants had a Lag 3/5 difference in the joint task that was in
the range of the difference scores in the individual task.
To further explore the possibility that an attentional blink was
present in the individual and joint conditions, the detection rates
for T2 at Lags 3 and 5 in the different tasks were submitted
to separate Bayesian analyses. This analysis has the benefit of
generating an estimate of the amount of evidence in favor of the
alternative hypothesis that there is an attentional blink and the
null hypothesis that there is no attentional blink in the different
conditions. The model used in the Bayesian analysis specified that
the detection rates in the Lag 5 condition would be higher than
the Lag 3 condition. The results of the analysis were consistent
with results of the t-tests. That is, the estimated Bayes factor
(BF) for the individual condition indicated that the data were
40,789 times more likely under the alternative hypothesis than
the null hypothesis (BF10 = 40,789). This BF equates to extreme
evidence in favor of the alternative hypothesis that there was
an attentional blink in the individual condition. For the joint
condition, the BF indicated that the data were 6.462 more likely
under the null hypothesis (BF10 = 0.155). This result is considered
as a moderate evidence in favor of the null hypothesis that there
would be no difference between the detection rates for the Lags
3 and 5 in the joint condition. Overall, the results of the t-tests,
Bayesian analyses, and the confidence intervals of the difference
in detection rates at Lags 3 and 5 are consistent and provide
converging evidence for the conclusion that an attentional blink
was present in the individual condition, whereas no attentional
blink was present in the joint condition.
As discussed earlier, it could be that experience performing
a task increases the knowledge of the task and increases the
potential for, or strength of, the co-representation and simulation
of the partner’s task. As such, a joint attentional blink might only
emerge after the participant responding to T2 in the joint task
has experience performing both parts of the task in the individual
condition; that is, activation of the mechanisms leading a joint
attentional blink for individual participants may be dependent
on the person being able to form a representation of the whole
task. To test this prediction, additional analyses were performed
on the subgroup of participants who performed the individual
task before they completed the joint task in which they responded
to T2 – the group of participants who identified T2 in the last
block of trials. No joint attentional blink was observed in this
subgroup, t(10) = 1.07, p = 0.31, 95% CI of the Lag3/Lag5
difference [−10.27, 3.61]. The results of the Bayesian analysis that
tested a model where detection rates were lower at Lag 3 than at
Lag 5 revealed that the data were 1.27 times more likely under
the null hypothesis (BF10 = 0.79). This analysis provides only
anecdotal/inconclusive evidence in favor of the null hypothesis.
Despite the low sample size in this case, it is clear that there is no
behavioral evidence in favor of a joint attentional blink that, at an
individual level, is a robust phenomenon.
EXPERIMENT 2
Although an attentional blink was present in the individual task
where the individual responded to both T1 and T2, there was
no evidence for an attentional blink in the joint conditions of
Experiment 1. This finding stands in contrast to previous joint
visual search literature in which selection by the partner on the
preceding trial/display subsequently effects the selection of the
individual (e.g., Frischen et al., 2009; Welsh et al., 2005; Welsh
and McDougall, 2012). Thus, it is possible that co-representation
does not influence the mechanisms leading to the attentional
blink. It is interesting to note, however, that there has been
one previous report of a null joint effect – the psychological
refractory period [see Dux and Marois (2009) for some discussion
in the mechanisms involved in this effect]. Interestingly, Liepelt
and Prinz (2011) reported that a social psychological refractory
period was not spontaneously elicited in conditions similar
to Experiment 1 in which no specific instructions were given
to participants to monitor the partner’s performance. A social
psychological refractory period was observed, however, when
participants were instructed to “monitor” their partner’s task.
These instructions essentially asked participants to perform the
whole task as an individual, but only actually respond to one-half
of the task.
In consideration of the results of the findings of Liepelt and
Prinz (2011), a second experiment was conducted to determine
if specific instructions to monitor the performance of the
partners could produce a joint attentional blink. Specifically,
in Experiment 1, participants were not given any specific
instructions for the participants to monitor the performance
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of the partner and co-representation and the mechanisms of
the attentional blink were left to spontaneously emerge. Thus,
Experiment 2 was conducted to determine if a joint attentional
blink would emerge when participants were specifically asked to
monitor what their partner was doing.
Materials and Methods
Participants
Forty-four undergraduate students from the University of
Toronto participated in the experiment for course credit. A larger
sample size was collected for Experiment 2 to increase the
power for the analysis on the subgroup of participants who
completed the individual task before completing the joint task –
the subgroup that was analyzed to determine if completing the
individual task first increases the potential for observing an
attentional blink in the joint task. Participants were aged 18–
30 years old (M = 18.78, SD = 1.88) and 26 were female. All
participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision.
Design, Stimuli, Apparatus, and Procedure
All aspects of Experiment 2 were identical to those of Experiment
1 except for two important differences. First, the experimenter
specifically instructed participants to monitor the performance
of their partner during the joint task. That is, participants were
told that they would receive global feedback on their performance
on the trials. Participants were also told that, to determine who
made an error on an incorrect trial, they would need to pay
attention to the other person’s task. Global feedback was provided
to participants after the response to the T2 was registered. If
both participants answered correctly, they were notified that
they were correct. If one participant made an error or both
participants answered incorrectly, then they were notified that
they were incorrect. Note that this manipulation is only a subtle
promotion of monitoring behavior because if participants had
faith in their own answer and abilities, then they would not
need to monitor what the other person was doing. Further, there
was no direct incentive for participants to monitor because they
were not asked if the other person made a correct response or
not.
The second difference was that the number of trials in each
block was decreased from 240 in Experiment 1 to 160 in
Experiment 2. Because the proportions of target present and
absent trials remained the same, this decrease in overall trial
number meant that there were only 80 trials on which T2 was
present in the given task. The number of trials was decreased in
Experiment 2 because the global feedback took additional time
to deliver. Thus, to maintain relative consistency in the overall
time required to complete the task (and prevent boredom), the
number of trials were decreased.
Results
The data from one participant in both conditions were removed
because they only completed half of the trials. One joint data set
was lost along with five individual data sets because the program
failed to record the output file correctly. The data from one final
participant from the individual condition was removed because
their accuracy rate for T1 was 0%. Accuracy rates for T2 at
each lag for each participant were then calculated. Accuracy rates
for T2 were calculated the same way as in Experiment 1. For
the individual task, T2 accuracy was only considered for trials
on which T1 was correctly identified, whereas T2 accuracy on
all trials was considered for the joint task. T1 was identified
accurately on an average of 93.68% trials (SD = 6.01%) on the
individual task and an average of 97.07% trials (SD = 5.75%)
in the joint task. All participants had accuracy rates for T2
above 50% at Lag 7 and, as such, all remaining data were
retained.
Consistent with the approach to analysis in Experiment 1,
separate paired samples t-tests and the equivalent Bayes test
were conducted for joint and individual conditions on accuracy
for T2 at Lag 3 and Lag 5. An attentional blink was detected
in the individual condition, t(37) = −6.63, p < 0.001, 95%
CI of Lag3/Lag5 differences [−28.06, −14.93]. The results of
the Bayesian analysis are consistent with this finding: the data
were 334,853 more likely under the alternative hypothesis, which
is extreme support for a difference between Lag 3 and Lag 5
in the individual condition (BF10 = 334,853). Conversely, as
can be seen in Figure 3, no attentional blink was observed
in the joint condition, t(41) = −1.57, p = 0.12, 95% CI
of difference scores [−7.252, 0.911]. The BF was unable to
differentiate between support for the null and the alternative
hypotheses (BF10 = 0.973). Finally, as in Experiment 1, the
number of participants who demonstrated a joint attentional
blink of the magnitude of the attentional blink in the individual
task was determined by comparing the difference between
the detection rates at Lag 3 and Lag 5 in the joint task
to the 95% confidence intervals for the attentional blink in
the individual task (−28.06 to −14.93). Only 8 of the 41
participants had a Lag 3/5 difference in the joint task that
was in the range of the difference scores in the individual
task.
Although completing the individual task before identifying
T2 in the joint task did not seem to potentiate the joint
attentional blink in Experiment 1, this analysis was conducted
on a relatively low sample size. With the larger sample size
in Experiment 2, we again conducted a paired sample t-test
on the participants who performed the individual task before
FIGURE 3 | Detection rates of T2 (% of correctly identified as a function of the
targets presented) for Experiment 2. Error bars represent standard error of the
mean. ∗Denotes significance at p < 0.05.
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responding to T2 in the joint task – the group of participants
who identified T2 in the last block of trials. Consistent with
the findings of Experiment 1, no joint attentional blink was
observed in this subgroup in Experiment 2, t(19) = −1.70,
p = 0.11, 95% CI of the Lag3/Lag5 differences [−12.29, 1.29].
The results of the Bayesian analysis in which the detection
rates at Lag 3 were compared to those at Lag 5 again provided
inconclusive evidence that is slightly in favor of the alternative
(BF10 = 1.47). Overall, even with the increased sample size and
instructions that prompted participants to monitor the behavior
of the partner, an attentional blink did not clearly emerge in the
joint task.
General Discussion
The purpose of the present study was to determine if an
attentional blink would emerge in a task in which two people
search for two different targets in a series of rapidly presented
characters. Although robust attentional blinks emerged in the
individual task in both Experiments 1 and 2 (accuracy at
detecting T2 at Lag 3 was worse than at Lag 5), no such
effect emerged in the joint task. Interestingly, neither previous
experience with the task (i.e., completing the individual task prior
to the joint task) nor instructions to monitor the performance
of the person identifying T1 potentiated or activated the
mechanisms of attentional blink in the joint task. Overall, the
absence of the attentional blink in the joint task suggests that the
mechanisms that generate the attentional blink were not activated
when individuals were aware that their partner must identify the
first target.
The finding that the detection of T2 was not affected in
the joint task was unexpected given the joint action and
social attention literature showing that individuals spontaneously
co-represent and simulate the performance of their partner.
In particular, in the studies of the joint negative priming
effect (Frischen et al., 2009; Welsh and McDougall, 2012), the
participant responding to the second (probe) display could
completely ignore the first (prime) display because it is irrelevant
to their task. Nonetheless, the joint negative priming effect
emerged, suggesting that the participant responding on the
probe display not only pays attention to the prime display,
but also engages in the target/distractor selection process that
leads to negative priming. Based on the findings of the joint
negative priming effect (and similar findings in the social IOR
effect; e.g., Welsh et al., 2005, 2007), it was predicted that
the person responding to T2 could spontaneously co-represent
their partners task and search for and identify T1 even though
it was not part of their task. Evidently, such was not the
case.
The absence of the joint attentional blink is similar to previous
research on the attentional blink when individuals act alone.
Specifically, Raymond et al. (1992) reported that the accuracy of
responses to T2 was essentially unaffected in a task in which T1
was present, but the participant was instructed to ignore it. Thus,
on first glance, it might not seem surprising that the detection
of T2 in the joint task was not affected by T1 in the present
studies because the participant detecting T2 did not ever have to
identify and could effectively ignore T1. However, previous work
that examined how the (non)identification of T1 affected the
processing of T2 was always conducted in individual task contexts
(i.e., without the presence of a co-actor identifying T1 and
identifying T1 was not relevant at all). In the present study, each
co-actor knew the task of their partner: the participant detecting
T2 knew that the other participant was attempting to identify
T1. Further, previous work using other social visual search tasks
has revealed that the preceding action of a partner affects the
performance of an individual in a manner that is similar to when
the individual performs the entire task on their own, even if
that response is independent of and not immediately relevant to
the subsequent response (e.g., Welsh et al., 2005; Frischen et al.,
2009; Welsh and McDougall, 2012). Thus, the absence of a social
attentional blink requires a theoretical explanation, and a detailed
discussion of the possible reasons why will be the focus of the
remainder of the paper.
Co-representation
Previous information processing effects observed in joint
contexts were suggested to emerge because co-actors observed
and knew (co-represented) their partners’ task and response, and
that this co-representation leads to the spontaneous activation of
the mechanisms that are activated when the individual performs
the whole task on their own (e.g., Sebanz et al., 2003; Welsh
et al., 2005; Frischen et al., 2009). Based on this premise, it
was predicted that each partner in the present studies would
co-represent the task of the partner. As a result of this co-
representation, even though they were not required to respond
to T1, the participant responding to T2 alone would represent
(and perhaps simulate) the task of the partner and that this
co-representation would subsequently activate the mechanisms
leading to the attentional blink. Such was evidently not the case.
Before addressing why the effect did not emerge, two further
observations will be discussed.
The first observation is that completing the individual task
before the joint task did not affect the emergence of the joint
attentional blink. Completing the individual task first could have
increased the potential for a joint attentional blink because recent
work suggests that experience with a movement task increases the
accuracy of action perception (e.g., Chandrasekharan et al., 2012;
Wong et al., 2013), increases the responsiveness of cortical areas
activated during action observation (Calvo-Merino et al., 2005;
Catmur et al., 2007), and affects the manner in which a co-actor
adapts their actions for their partner (Ray et al., 2017). Previous
experience is thought to have these effects because performance
of the task (generating the action and sensing and perceiving the
outcomes of the action) establishes, refines, and/or strengthens
the coupling between the representations of the action and the
perceptual consequences of those actions (Prinz, 1992; Hommel
et al., 2001; Kunde, 2001; Elsner and Hommel, 2004; Gozli
et al., 2016). Because it is these coupled perception-action codes
that are thought to be activated during action observation and
joint action, experience-based enhancements of these perception-
action codes would have increased the knowledge and potential
strength of the co-representation processes thereby increasing the
potential for a joint attentional blink. No joint attentional blink,
however, was observed in the performance of these individuals
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who gained task experience before performing the T2 detection
in the joint task.
The second observation is that an attentional blink did not
emerge even under instructions to monitor the performance of
the partner (Experiment 2). These overt instructions to monitor
the performance of the partner that identified T1 were expected
to promote co-representation and the potential for the activation
of the mechanisms that would generate a joint attentional
blink. The absence of a joint effect under these instructions is
not consistent with the findings in a paper reporting a social
psychological refractory period effect – this effect only emerged
under instructions that promoted partners to monitor each
other’s performance (Liepelt and Prinz, 2011). However, it is
possible that the social psychological refractory period effect
emerged (though not spontaneously) because it involves response
initiation or selection processes (Lien and Proctor, 2002) similar
to many other effects that have companion joint effects such as
the joint Simon effect (Sebanz et al., 2003) and the social IOR
effect (Welsh et al., 2005).
So why was it that the attentional blink did not emerge
in this study? First, despite instructions and expectations, it is
possible that the participant responding to T2 did not know
what the partner was doing and, as such, did not engage
in co-representation. Without co-representation, joint effects
are unlikely or unable to emerge. Although this possibility
cannot be definitively ruled out, we believe it is likely that co-
representation did occur because both participants were present
during the delivery of the instructions and there is a wealth of
previous research showing that joint effects (presumably due to
spontaneous co-representation) under such conditions. Further,
the participants in Experiment 2 were explicitly instructed to
monitor the performance of the partner. Finally, the joint
attentional blink did not emerge even in the subgroup who
experienced the individual task prior to completing the T2
detection in the joint task – the subgroup who definitely had
knowledge of both of the task components. Thus, we are
confident that each participant knew the task and that co-
representation occurred. The discussion will now turn to possible
reasons why an attentional blink did not emerge despite co-
representation.
Potential Reasons Why the Joint Attentional Blink Did
Not Emerge
Based on the assumption that co-representation did occur, it
seems that co-representation does not exert an effect upon
the processes linked to the attentional blink. There are a
number of possible reasons why the joint attentional blink
did not emerge. The three most likely possible accounts will
be addressed in turn. First, note that the majority of the
previous studies on joint action have accounts that emphasize
the role of “action” processing in generating the effects –
processes that operate in spatial attention and response planning
and selection such as the joint Simon effect (Sebanz et al.,
2003), joint negative priming (Frischen et al., 2009; Welsh
and McDougall, 2012), and social IOR (Welsh et al., 2005).
Although some explanations of the attentional blink effect have
a response selection component (Jolicoeur, 1998), the majority
of the accounts of the attentional blink hold that the attentional
blink emerges because of earlier attentional processes and/or
limitations in the loading of or processing of information in
working memory (see Dux and Marois, 2009). Hence, it is
possible that mechanisms of co-representation preferentially
operate on the level of decision making, response selection, and
response programming rather than at earlier attentional and
working memory processes.
In this context, it should be noted that there is evidence
that the presence of another individual does affect perceptual
and attentional processing. For example, there is evidence for
spontaneous visuospatial perspective taking across a number
of tasks (e.g., Böckler et al., 2011; Freundlieb et al., 2016,
2017, 2018). Further, Böckler et al. (2011) reported that the
global/local processing of a stimulus was affected by the partner’s
level processing (performance was less efficient when co-actors
were to report a different level of feature than when they were
to report the same level of feature). Finally, Constable et al.
(2015) revealed that an object-specific recognition effect was
altered by the hand posture of a co-actor. Interestingly, all these
perceptual and attentional tasks, such as negative priming and
IOR, involve a spatial dimension either regarding the features
of the stimuli or of the co-actor. Thus, the attentional blink
might not have emerged in the joint condition because the
task employed in the present study is essentially non-spatial in
nature (all stimuli were presented centrally), involved stimuli that
were distinguished based on timing and identity, and did not
involve response selection during the critical period of processing
(cf. Dolk et al., 2014; Dittrich et al., 2017; for demonstrations
of a spatial effect where co-representation may not exert an
influence). In sum, the joint attentional blink might not have
emerged because the processes activated and affected by co-
representation and those involved in attention blink do not
overlap.
Another, potentially related, possibility concerns the
conceptual overlap (or non-overlap) in tasks. Much in the
same way observing another person’s actions interfere more with
one’s task when they are relevant for one’s own task (Bortoletto
et al., 2013), perhaps another person’s task only interferes when
there is close conceptual or dimensional overlap across tasks.
For example, in the social Simon task (Sebanz et al., 2003), there
is spatial and color features of the targets that are shared, or
at least relevant, across participants. Similarly, in the work of
Böckler et al. (2011) and Constable et al. (2015), perceptual state
is relevant for the task. In the case of the present attentional
blink task, the two tasks might not have had sufficient conceptual
overlap to generate the joint effect – there is a temporal
staggering of the stimuli: one partner completes an identification
task before the other partner completes a detection task of a white
stimulus in a string of black stimuli. These differences might
have made the overall joint task less of a dynamic interaction
than typical joint action tasks (e.g., Welsh et al., 2005; Frischen
et al., 2009) and make each partner’s task more conceptually
distinct.
A final explanation of the findings concerns the mental
(attentional) states induced by completing a task with another
individual. Previous work has revealed that if participants
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acting alone are required to complete an additional task (such
as thinking about a holiday) while concurrently doing the
attentional blink task, the attentional blink effect is attenuated
(Olivers and Nieuwenhuis, 2005, 2006). Further, positive affect
has also been shown to attenuate the attentional blink (Olivers
and Nieuwenhuis, 2006). Given that positive affect is linked with
diffusion of attention (Ashby et al., 1999), there is converging
evidence suggesting that a diffuse attentional state can attenuate
the attentional blink. Because of the social nature of the
present joint task, it is also possible that the resulting positive
environment and affect in the joint condition may have led to
a diffuse attentional state. Thus, a joint attentional blink might
not have been observed because of this diffuse attentional state.
It should be noted, however, that previous studies typically report
attenuated attentional blink effects rather than an abolishment of
the effect as seen in the present study. As such, we feel that it is
unlikely that a diffuse attentional state was the sole source of the
absence of a joint attentional blink in the present study.
SUMMARY
In sum, the two experiments reported herein provide no
evidence for the emergence of a joint attentional blink even
when participants had previous task experience and specific
instructions to monitor the performance of the partner. The
possible reasons for the lack of such a joint effect are explored
which can guide future research into understanding joint
temporal processes.
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